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INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE, MASS TORTS, AND
"SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS": AN
INTRODUCTION
Roger C. Cramtont
The tension between individual justice (party autonomy in an ad-
versary system) and collective justice (aggregated handling of legal
claims) is the basic theme of the symposium featured in this issue of
the Cornell Law Review. Nowhere is this tension more evident than in
recent efforts to use "settlement class actions" as a means for large-
scale resolution of personal injury or property damage claims arising
out of exposure to defective products or toxic substances. Important
and novel issues of tort law, civil procedure, constitutional due pro-
cess, and lawyer behavior are presented by settlements resolving the
tort claims of future as well as current claimants.' Pending cases pro-
vide a number of examples: (1) a class containing millions of persons
occupationally exposed to asbestos,2 (2) a class of more than one mil-
t Roger C. Cramton is the Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
These comments were prepared for a two-day colloquium on the use of "settlement class
actions" to resolve mass exposure torts, held at the Cornell Law School on October 23-24,
1994. The reader should know that I served as an expert wimess on legal ethics issues for
asbestos victims objecting to the proposed settlement in Georgine v. Amchem Products,
Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), discussed infra note 2. I have also been consulted by
lawyers representing intervenors in Beeman v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-47363 (Tex. Dist. CL,
Harris County Feb. 16, 1995) (infra note 6).
1 "Current claimants" are persons who have already asserted a claim against a defen-
dant. "Future claimants" include two groups of people-those who have a matured claim
but have not yet asserted it, and those who may have been exposed to a substance but have
not yet suffered the harm that gives rise to a tort cause of action.
2 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The case was
filed as Carlough v. Amchem Products, Inc. on January 15, 1993, with simultaneous filings by
the Settling Parties of a complaint, answer, and stipulation of settlement. On Dec. 22,
1993, Robert A. Georgine was substituted as a representative plaintiff for Edward J.
Carlough. Several opinions in the case have been published: Carlough v. Amchem Prod-
ucts, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (rejecting various objections to the subject
matter jurisdiction of the district court); Carlough v. Amchem Products, Inc., 158 F.R.D.
314 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (giving conditional approval to the settlement and dealing with various
notice issues); and Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(Judge Reed's decision approving the proposed class action settlement as fair and reason-
able and rejecting attacks on the settlement and Class Counsel's representation of the
class). Another large asbestos class action settlement is currently pending. See Ahearn v.
Fibreboard Corp., No. 93-526 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 1993 and Mar. 20, 1995) (unreported
orders provisionally certifying class for settlement purposes and approving the settlement
providing the agreement is modified to eliminate one conflict of interest). Aheam is simi-
lar to Georgine in that in both the class is limited to future claimants (i.e., those who did not
file a lawsuit before a specified date), but the cases differ in important respects: (1) Aheam
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lion women who received breast implants,3 (3) a class containing all of
the owners of Ford Bronco all-terrain vehicles, 4 (4) a class of owners
of GM pickups with saddlebag gas tanks,5 and (5) a class of current
and future owners of homes that have a polybutylene plumbing sys-
tem, an allegedly defective plumbing material that has been installed
in three million mobile homes and an estimated four to five million
site-built homes.6
This use of the class action device, like most other new develop-
ments, has both long- and short-term antecedents, such as the historic
powers of equity judges7 and the modem phenomenon of "manage-
rial judges" who actively participate in case handling and take a force-
ful role in pressing settlement.8 Yet, the recent class actions
mentioned above, which contain a novel combination of features, il-
lustrate something quite new in degree and kind. For example, the
cases were either brought or certified for settlement purposes rather
than to be tried; the plaintiff class includes future victims, many of
whom have yet to suffer a legally cognizable injury; approved settle-
ments will bind absent class members, many of whom may not have
had an effective opportunity to opt out of the class; the settlements
affect claims nationwide and may have the effect of a federal decree
eliminating claims governed by state law or a state decree eliminating
claims governed by federal law; and in some of the cases, the plain-
tiffs' lawyers representing the class entered into side settlements with
is a mandatory class action brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (1); and
(2) the terms of the two settlements differ in many details. The Georgine case is discussed in
Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80
CORNELL L. Rxv. 1045 (1995), and Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of
Mass Torts: Wihen the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1159 (1995).
3 See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Coming
Corp.), Nos. CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P-11558-S, MDL No. 926, 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 1, 1994) (Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr.'s order approving, with certain modifications, as
either within the court's power or believed acceptable to the parties, the proposed class
action settlement as fair, reasonable, adequate, and non-collusive).
4 In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., No. Civ. A. MDL-991, 1995 WL
222177 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 1995) (settlement disapproved because not a fair, reasonable,
and adequate compromise of plaintiff's claims).
5 In re General Motors Corp. Pi~k-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. ULab. Litig., Nos. 94-
1064, 94-1194, 94-1195, 94-1198, 94-1202, 94-1203, 94-1207, 94-1208, 94-1219, 1995 WL
223209 (3d Cir. Apr. 17, 1995) (disapproving and remanding for further consideration a
settlement of the property damage claims of a class of about 5.7 million owners of most
GM pickups and recreational vehicles for most model years between 1973 and 1991, but
excluding Texas owners). In Bloyed v. General Motors Corp., 881 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1994), the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in approving a class
action settlement involving Texas owners and containing substantially the same terms.
6 Beeman v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-47363 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Harris County, Feb. 16,
1995) (class action and proposed settlement summarily dismissed without explanation).
7 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort
Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. Rnv. 269.
8 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. Rxv. 374 (1982).
[-Vol. 80:811
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the defendants, giving their current clients different and more
favorable relief than the class settlement provides to future claimants.9
A class action settlement with these features would have been unthink-
able to lawyers of a decade or so ago.
This symposium, which deals with an interrelated whole, is organ-
ized in parts that explore the common problems from the perspec-
tives of tort law, class action law, and the law and ethics governing
lawyers. Two papers from each perspective are followed by two or
three short comments. The papers and comments are preceded by
this introduction, a foreword by Judge Jack B. Weinstein, 10 a pioneer
in this field, and an afterword by Judge William W Schwarzer," for-
mer director of the Federal Judicial Center.
Recent class action settlements such as those previously men-
tioned raise several questions. Some of the most central are:
(1) Is the individual justice provided by tort law in the courts so
delayed, erratic, and inefficient that it should be replaced by
schemes of collective justice molded by self-interested parties and
approved by a single federal district judge? If administrative
schemes are to be substituted for the tort system, should this be
accomplished by legislation rather than by private settlements ap-
proved by a single judge? The papers by Peter Schuck, John
Siiciano, and the commentators on their papers address these
questions.
(2) Does a federal district court have authority to enter a de-
cree that eliminates or displaces the personal injury rights, other-
wise governed by state law, of individuals who have been exposed to
a product or substance but have not yet suffered a legal injury (fu-
ture claimants whose claims have not yet matured when notice is
given of the opportunity to opt out)? Similarly, does a state court
have authority to perform the same function on a nationwide basis,
eliminating claims both under other states' laws and under federal
law? These questions are among those that Richard Marcus, John
Coffee, and the commentators on their papers address.
(3) How can adequate notice of opportunity to opt out of a
class action, required by due process, be provided to "exposure
only' persons who do not and cannot know that they will suffer an
9 The Georgine case involves all of these features in addition to the following- (1) the
claims-handling process available to future claimants is run and controlled by the defend-
ants rather than by an independent or neutral body supervised by the court; and (2) class
counsel, who monitor and supervise this claims-handling process, may handle claims
before panels whose members they assist in selecting and monitoring.
10 Jack B. Weinstein, An Introduction to Who's Who in Mass Toxic Torts, 80 CoRNrLL L.
REv. 845 (1995).
11 William W Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80
CoRNELL L. REv. 837 (1995).
1995]
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injury in the future?12 Is "adequate representation" provided when
a lawyer negotiates cash settlements for the lawyer's current clients
simultaneously with a class action settlement providing different
terms for future claimants? Do the virtues of private settlement and
alternative dispute resolution justify departures from general princi-
ples of legal ethics? These questions are among those that Susan
Koniak, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, and the commentators on their pa-
pers address.
This introduction provides a setting for the reader's consideration of
the many issues raised by the symposium and, in a concluding section,
states my personal views on some of them.
The American common-law system emphasizes party control of
litigation rather than judicial prosecution and investigation.' 3 The ad-
versary system presupposes opposing parties who exercise a wide
range of choice on whether, where, and when a lawsuit is filed; what
claims and defenses are asserted; what resources should be devoted to
the litigation; and whether the case is settled or tried. The common-
law judge is envisioned as a neutral, relatively passive arbiter of con-
flicting private interests who rules on questions of law and supervises
the conduct of the litigation. Party initiative and the underlying prin-
ciple of individual autonomy are supported by the constitutional right
of trial by jury, which presupposes a detailed evaluation of particularis-
tic facts bearing on the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's defenses.
The American tort system reflects the same values by requiring
proof of fault, causation, and harm before one person's loss is shifted
12 In the asbestos cases, such as Georgine, at least two types of future claimants consti-
tute the plaintiff class: (1) persons who had fully matured legal claims but who, had not
filed suit against the defendants prior to the date of filing of the class action; and (2)
persons who were occupationally exposed to defendants' products but had not yet suffered
a legal injury. In the polybutylene pipe case, Beeman v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-47363 (Tex.
Dist. Ct., Harris County Feb. 16, 1995), the settlement purports to bind future owners of
homes with this type of plumbing system, individuals who as yet have not even been ex-
posed to defendants' product. Exposed persons whose claims may develop in the future
may not recognize that class notice is applicable to them and, even if they do recognize its
relevance, may lack knowledge about the injury necessary for an informed decision to opt
out of the class. Those who have not been related to the defendants' conduct in any way
cannot know that a published notice pertains to them, nor can they have a realistic oppor-
tunity to opt out unless a "back-end opt-out" is built into the settlement agreement.
'3 SeeJohn H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Cii. L. REv.
823 (1985) (comparing common law and continental civil procedure);Judith Resnik, From
"Cases" to "Litigation", LAw & CoTrrnp. PRoBS., Summer 1991, at 5, 64 (stressing "the weak-
ening of the link between individuals and lawsuits" as aggregative techniques of disposition
have become both more frequent and more acceptable); Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials
in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. IL. L. Rnv. 69 (restating the arguments for individual
adjudication). An earlier article dealing with "public law litigation" helped to shape judi-
cial and professional attitudes. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litiga-
tion, 89 HAv. L. Ry. 1281 (1976).
814 [Vol. 80:811
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to someone else.' 4 The injured plaintiff must establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defendant's wrongful acts caused the
plaintiff's harm. Although tort law serves mixed goals-compensating
accident victims, deterring conduct that is wrongful or involves unrea-
sonable risks to the health or safety of others, and punishing wrongdo-
ers-the central notion until quite recently has been one of corrective
justice-repairing, to the extent possible with a money award, the
harm that one individual's wrongful act has caused another.15 Proof
that the defendant's wrongful act has caused the plaintiffs injury inev-
itably requires a particularistic assessment of the plaintiffs and defen-
dant's conduct, a causal relationship between their actions and the
claimed harm, and a valuation of the plaintiff s resulting injury.
Two developments in the twentieth century threaten to displace
the traditional model of individual rights and party autonomy. First,
many judges participate more actively in the management, conduct,
and settlement of litigation. Second, pressures flow from the volume,
complexity, cost, and interrelatedness of what are referred to here as
"mass exposure torts."
Since the development of negligence doctrine in the nineteenth
century, the paradigm case of the traditional tort is an accident in
which an actor's vehicle-whether stage coach, railroad, or automo-
bile-has injured a stranger. The individualized approach to adjudi-
cating such disputes seemed natural, if not inevitable, given the
premises of American law and the constitutional right to a jury trial.
In today's world, however, America's market economy encourages
mass. distribution of products of new, and perhaps untested, technol-
ogy. Thousands of strangers may be injured by the dissemination and
use of a single product. Mass exposure to these products or sub-
stances creates situations in which a large number of people believe,
or are led to believe, that the defendant's product caused their inju-
ries. The resulting volume of litigation poses problems that threaten
both the tort system's reliance on individual responsibility and the
procedural system's reliance on party initiative and control.
Mass exposure torts threaten these aspects of the tort system for
several reasons. First, proving or determining whether exposure to
the product or substance caused the claimed injury is difficult.16 Fre-
quently, the exposure that leads to claims of injury occurs over a sub-
14 SeeJohn A. Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNLu L REv. 990
(1995).
15 For discussion of corrective justice in tort law, see George P. Fletcher, Fairness and
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HtAv. L. REv. 537 (1972); Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Correc-
tive Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1981).
16 Causation issues are discussed in David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass
Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 851 (1984);
Siliciano, supra note 14, at 992-95.
1995]
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stantial period of time, and the injury itself may have a long latency
period. Often there is scientific uncertainty as to whether the expo-
sure caused the alleged harm or whether the condition was the result
of the individual's conduct (smoking, for example) or the presence of
background substances in the natural environment. Frequently, ex-
pert witnesses will be able to testify about causation only in terms of
statistical probabilities based on scattered or inconclusive epidemio-
logical studies.
Second, in many cases it is difficult or impossible to determine
which of multiple actors caused the claimed injury.1 7 If the harm has
a long latency period, evidence of whose product or substance caused
the harm may be unavailable fifteen or thirty years after the product's
distribution and consumption. A related problem arises in cases in-
volving long-term occupational exposure, such as in the asbestos field.
The worker may have been exposed to several products, each with
somewhat different injury characteristics, manufactured by a number
of companies over a lengthy period of time. In such a case, it may be
difficult for the plaintiff to establish that the named defendant or de-
fendants were responsible for the plaintiffs harm.
Third, it is doubtful whether individualized justice can be pro-
vided when thousands or even millions of claims flow from mass expo-
sure to a product or substance. For example, millions of Americans
were exposed occupationally to asbestos products from the 1930s
through the 1970s, before regulatory and safety controls reduced the
future danger. Many of those exposed have died or suffered injuries,
and the exposure will claim further victims well into the twenty-first
century.' 8 As another example, over one million women had silicone
gel breast implants between 1979 and 1994. As of yet, only a small
17 The problem of identifying the correct defendant led to the creation of a theory of
market-share liability in the DES cases, such as Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924
(Cal. 1980), under which all defendants marketing the harmful substance are liable in
proportion to their share of the total market. The market-share approach, adopted in six
states in DES cases, has not been extended to other products or activities, such as asbestos.
Products containing DES are virtually identical, exposure to DES results in a rare and dis-
tinct form of cancer, and the long latency period prevents the plaintiff from establishing
which manufacturer produced the DES that the plaintiff used. In contrast, market-share
approaches have been rejected in asbestos cases because a wide variety of asbestos products
pose somewhat different dangers, the varied uses of asbestos result in differing exposure
rates, and asbestos may cause a number of different diseases, some of which (e.g., lung
cancer) are not specific to asbestos exposure.
18 For discussion of the health dangers of asbestos and estimates of the likely injuries,
see In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 730-745 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991). The
volume of court filings are discussed in AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, COMPLEX LrrIrATION:
STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS 10 (1994) (containing caseload data and stat-
ing "[t]he giant of complex litigation has been and continues to be asbestos") [hereinafter
ALl PROJECT].
[Vol. 80:811
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portion of this group has suffered injury, and the causal relationship
between implants and some injuries remains uncertain.' 9
The sheer number of claims in cases like these creates trouble-
some problems of judicial delay, repetitive trials, high transaction
costs, and an inevitable interrelationship among claimants. As indi-
cated earlier, claimants may suffer from a "disease" rather than the
type of immediate physical injury associated with a traumatic accident.
Causation may be established only by reliance on probabilistic meth-
ods. Publicity given to the dangers of use or exposure to the product
gives rise to new claims, such as the emotional harm flowing from fear
of contracting the disease in the future, and increases the percentage
of victims who assert claims. Evidence that defendants knew of the
products' risks but failed to warn those exposed to them supports pu-
nitive damage claims that threaten producers with large, unpredict-
able, and recurring judgments based on the same conduct.
Individual trials that replicate evidence of exposure, causation,
and injury in case after case burden the courts, create judicial delay,
and carry high transaction costs. In conventional tort litigation, ap-
proximately sixty percent of amounts paid go to accident victims. A
study of asbestos litigation estimates that plaintiffs only receive about
forty percent of each litigation dollar.20 Critics assert that lawyers, in-
surance companies, and litigation expenses consume too much of the
amounts available to compensate victims.2 ' If fault and causation re-
quirements were eliminated entirely from complex, difficult cases of
mass tort exposure, as was done in social security disability or workers'
compensation cases, transaction costs could be greatly reduced.
The model of individualized justice posits that each claimant
should make all relevant decisions with respect to her claim. The exis-
tence of a host of other similar claims inevitably affects these decisions
because a claimant will "now have to take into account the existence
of the other claimants, the extent to which the other claims may de-
plete the assets of the tortfeasor, and the possible savings which may
be achieved by sharing the costs of litigation."22 If payment of com-
pensatory and punitive damages to early claimants results in a pro-
ducer's insolvency, future claimants will receive little or nothing.
19 See Heidi Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation 27-40
(1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing the breast implants liti-
gation and the scientific evidence concerning causation).
20 SeeJAMES S. KAKAUiK Er AL, RAND CORPORATION INSTITUTE FOR CIVILJUSTICE, COsTs
OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION 40 (1983);JAMES S. KAKAUK ET AL., RAND CORPORATION INSTITUTE
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES 91
(1984).
21 See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (discuss-
ing studies of costs of asbestos litigation).
22 Courtiand H. Peterson & Joachim Zekoll, Mass Torts, 42 AM..J. COMP. L. 79, 97
(1994).
1995]
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Some courts assume that maintaining the solvency of corporate actors
is a desirable objective wholly apart from its effect on future claimants.
The high costs of proving causation in the individual case may be
reduced by a collective action that spreads the costs of discovery, ex-
pert testimony, and litigation among many claimants. Thus, collective
justice appeals to all parties to some degree and to courts and judges
almost without exception. Plaintiffs avoid the "free rider" problem by
sharing the costs of discovering evidence and proving causation and
fault. Defendants benefit from reduced transaction costs and fixed
liability, displacing the uncertainty of unpredictable future liability.
Courts similarly benefit from reduced caseloads because thousands of
individual cases are combined into one large class action, and claims
are processed outside the courts.
These characteristics of mass exposure torts produce pressures
that result in efforts at aggregative or collective justice. One possible
technique of aggregation, that of partyjoinder, has only limited appli-
cation to mass tort situations.23 Permissive joinder leaves to the par-
ties the decision of whether to join other persons as plaintiffs or
defendants, and does not permit judges to expand litigation when
they believe doing so would be more efficient. Compulsory joinder
provisions, which require necessary parties to be joined and do not
permit the action to proceed if an indispensable party cannot be
joined, have little application to mass tort situations because each
claimant has an independent claim that may proceed without thejoin-
der of other claimants. Federal courtjoinder of plaintiffs and defend-
ants is also greatly limited when, as in most tort matters, jurisdiction
rests upon diversity of citizenship. Complete diversity, required for
joinder, generally cannot be satisfied in mass tort situations.
Consolidation of cases offers somewhat greater promise. A fed-
eral court has broad discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42 (a) to consolidate specific issues or cases involving a common ques-
tion of law or fact when doing so would promote judicial economy.24
Consolidation, however, applies only to cases pending before one par-
ticular court and does not affect claims filed in other courts or claims
that have not yet been filed ("future claims").
Since 1968, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has had
authority to consolidate in a single district all civil actions pending in
federal district courts when the cases involve common questions of
fact, and transfer would serve interests of judicial economy, fairness,
23 See FED. P- CrV. P. 19 (compulsory joinder); id. 20 (permissive joinder).
24 Id. 42 (a). For a discussion of the use of aggregative techniques in mass tort cases,
see Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition ofRelated Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REv. LITIG.
231 (1991).
818 [Vol. 80:811
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and the convenience of the parties and witnesses. 25 A multidistrict
transfer for pretrial proceedings almost invariably results in settlement
of the transferred claims. The transfer facilitates investigation and dis-
covery of underlying factual issues, and the common understanding
flowing from exchange of information may provide the middle
ground consensus that often leads to settlement.
Other less palatable reasons also further settlement of multidis-
trict cases. The transferee judge often takes an active role in encour-
aging or pressing settlement. Defendants normally refuse to settle
individual cases, holding out for "global settlements" involving both
future and current claimants. In addition, plaintiffs and their lawyers
are in a weaker bargaining position because their cases probably will
not be set for trial for three to five years, a period in which plaintiffs
are without remedy and their lawyers have large amounts of working
capital tied up in their portfolio of cases.26
The third major device-the class action-is the principal focus
of this symposium. The class action is a procedural technique in
which representatives of a group (class representatives) may assert
against the defendants both their own claims and similar claims of
other persons who share a common interest. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a) requires that class actions meet four prerequisites,
generally referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and ade-
quacy. First, the class must be so numerous thatjoinder of all mem-
bers is impracticable. Second, questions of law or fact must be
common to the class. Third, the claims or defenses of the representa-
tive parties must be typical of the class as a whole. Finally, the repre-
sentative plaintiffs and their lawyers must "fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class."27
If the mass tort situation does not involve a bankruptcy, a trust or
estate administered by the court, or a limited fund, the prevailing rule
is that absent members of the class must be provided both with rea-
sonable notice of the class action and with an opportunity to exclude
themselves from the class by opting out.28 Class actions under Rule
23(b) (3), often referred to as "non-mandatory" or "opt-out" class ac-
tions, may be maintained as a class action if the action satisfies the
requirements of "predominance" and "superiority" contained in the
following rule provision:
25 See AL PROJECr, supra note 18, at 21-24 (discussing the multidistrict litigation stat-
ute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988), and other relevant materials).
26 See Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litiga-
tion, 53 U. CHI. L. R v. 440 (1986) (discussing cyclical evolution of asbestos litigation).
27 FED. 1L Civ. P. 23(a).
28 See Koniak, supra note 2, at 1087; Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law in Multistate Actions AfterPhillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE LJ. 1, 12-13
(1986); HERBERT B. NEWBERGO, CLAss AcrIONS § 1.07 (2d ed. 1985).
1995]
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An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) [discussed above] are satisfied, and in addition: ...
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.2 9
If questions of defendant fault or cause in fact cannot be resolved on a
class-wide basis, most courts refuse requests for certification in mass
tort cases on the ground that common issues do not "predominate"
over individual issues.30 Some courts, but not all, view the interest of
claimants in controlling their own personal injury case as negating the
"superiority" of a class action.
Although the legislative history of the 1966 amendment to Rule
23 states that the class action device is "ordinarily not appropriate" for
"[a] 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons,"3 ' fed-
eral courts in recent years have authorized class actions in a number
of single-incident mass accident cases3 2 and a smaller number of mass
exposure tort cases.33 The Agent Orange class action, involving the
claimed injuries of Vietnam veterans from battlefield exposure to di-
oxin manufactured by the defendants, was the first such case.3 4 Bank-
ruptcy situations involving a major asbestos defendant and the
manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device had class ac-
tion aspects.35
29 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (alteration added). Following this statement, the Rule
specifies four factors relevant to these findings.
30 Cases involving personal injuries occurring at different times and places as a result
of separate events resulting in exposures with some similar qualities generally are not certi-
fied. See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. flab. Litig., 693 F.2d
847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D.
719 (W.D. Mo. 1985). But seeJenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986),
reh'g denied en bane, 785 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding certification of an asbestos
class action).
31 See ALI PROJECT, supra note 18, at 27-28 (quoting and discussing the 1966 Advisory
Committee Note); Resnik, supra note 13, at 7-22 (same).
32 See, e.g., Sala v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 120 F.R.D. 494 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (train
passengers injured in a derailment).
33 See, e.g.,Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied en
bane, 785 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1986); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D.
Tex. 1990) (both involving asbestos workers in the Eastern District of Texas).
34 The history of the Agent Orange litigation is chronicled in PETER H. SCHUCK,.
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986). See In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), affid, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988) (upholding district court's approval of Agent Or-
ange settlement); see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied sub nom. Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994) (rejecting
collateral attack on Agent Orange settlement decree by a subsequent claimant).
35 See A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir. 1989).
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During the last year or two, a spate of mass exposure class actions
have raised novel and interesting questions. The major current cases,
discussed to varying degrees in the papers and comments of this sym-
posium, are: two class action settlements in the asbestos field (the
Georginea6 case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Ahearn 7
case in the Eastern District of Texas), the settlement of the silicone gel
breast implants litigation in the Northern District of Alabama (involv-
ing the Lindsey class38), the Ford Bronco 1I property damage case in an
Alabama state court,3 9 the similar litigation involving General Motors
pickup trucks,40 and the polybutylene plumbing case in a Texas state
court.4' In each of these cases, defendants facing mass tort claims
have combined with class action plaintiffs' lawyers in efforts to settle
the claims of current and future claimants. Some of these proposed
settlements have been approved by district courts as fair and reason-
able, but have not been reviewed by appellate courts (Georgine and
Ahearn). The proposed settlements have been rejected in the two mo-
tor vehicle cases. The breast implants case and other class action fil-
ings are pending before trial courts. Appellate review has occurred in
only one case (General Motors). These legal innovations will be tested
over the next few years until authoritative decisions, new procedural
rules, or legislative solutions replace conflicting arguments with stable
law-innovations which may be a long time coming. The dialogue in
this symposium may contribute to a fair and rational resolution of dis-
puted issues.
Collective justice, as this symposium demonstrates, has its distinc-
tive vices as well as its virtues. To the extent that compensating victims
becomes a major goal, considerations of fault, responsibility, and de-
terrence are muted or eliminated. Collective action may solve the
"free rider" problem of individualized justice-some litigants benefit-
ting from, but not contributing to, the expensive efforts of another
litigant in discovering causation and fault. But collective action cre-
ates the new and serious problem of the "kidnapped rider," an indi-
vidual deprived of any freedom of action by being drawn involuntarily
36 157 F.RD. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
37 No. 93-526 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 1993 and Mar. 20 1995).
38 In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Coming
Corp.), Nos. CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P-11558-S, MDL No. 926, 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 1, 1994).
39 In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco H Prods. Liab. Litig., No. Civ. A. MDL-991, 1995 WL
222177 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 1995).
40 In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 94-
1064, 94-1194, 94-1195, 94-1198, 94-1202, 94-1203, 94-1207, 94-1208, 94-1219, 1995 WL
223209 (3d Cir. Apr. 17, 1995).
41 Beeman v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-47363 (Tex. Dist Ct., Harris County Feb. 16,
1995).
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into collective litigation.42 Collective action may also deprive individu-
als of meaningful control over their own legal claims, pushing them
involuntarily into compensation grids and administrative claims-han-
dling processes to whose ministrations they have not consented.43
Collective justice also departs from the normal lawyer-client rela-
tionship in which the client makes decisions concerning objectives
and the client's lawyer makes tactical and procedural decisions. The
plaintiffs lawyer in traditional tort litigation is probably more in
charge of the case than traditional theory would suggest.44 But an
individual plaintiff represented by a lawyer retained on a contingent-
fee basis may discharge the lawyer at will and may decide whether or
not to accept a settlement offer. In most class actions, especially those
involving large classes of absent persons whose claims are of limited
worth or future creation, the lawyers representing the class ("class
counsel") are clearly in charge. Class counsel typically pick the class
representatives, frame the issues, push or abandon particular claims,
and make settlement decisions.45 Class action law even permits class
counsel to submit a settlement to the court that some or all of the
class representatives oppose. Class action lawyers, even more than
government lawyers who represent an amorphous "public," are their
own clients in the sense that their fiduciary responsibilities to class
members are what they determine them to be in the absence of court
supervision and scrutiny.
Judicial involvement in class action settlements is highly variable
and controversial. Court supervision and scrutiny may be present at
various stages of a class action and is required at a few stages. In some
multidistrict transfer situations, such as the breast implants case, the
trial judge participates extensively in the framing of the class action,
the designation of class counsel, and the negotiation of the settle-
ment. The active, behind-the-scenes role of some judges in "encour-
aging" settlement was a principal feature of the Agent Orange and
42 See Koniak, supra note 2.
43 Compare Trangsrud, supra note 13 (attacking the fairness of aggregative techniques)
with David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing IndividualJustice by Collective Means,
62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987) (arguing that aggregative techniques lead to fairer treatment of
claimants) and MichaelJ. Saks & Peter D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits
of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L RE%,. 815 (1992) (discussing
aggregative techniques used in Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex.
1990)).
44 See Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. I..
L. Rirv. 89.
45 For discussion of ethical issues in class action representation, seeJack B. Weinstein,
Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469 (1994); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintif's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement
of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. Ray. 669 (1986); Deborah L.
Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183 (1982).
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Dalkon Shield cases. 46 In other cases, such as those like Georgine in
which the proposed class action settlement was filed on the same day
as the class action, the judge participates publicly only when formal
motions are made to certify the class or to approve the settlement.
Facts aboutjudicial participation and role are largely dependent upon
what the judges themselves reveal.
Moreover, the provision governing the court's approval of class
action settlements offers very little guidance. Rule 23(e) provides:
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or com-
promise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as
the court directs.
4 7
This provision contains no standards, and the other provisions of Rule
23 provide only general ones-a "fair" and "reasonable" settlement
negotiated by class counsel who have provided "adequate representa-
tion" to the entire class, including its absent members. As Judge
Schwarzer argues in his afterword,48 many current problems are re-
lated to the generality of these standards. Judicial scrutiny of class
action settlements, influenced by judicial approbation of the docket-
paring results of settlement, suffers from the absence of a prescribed
procedure and detailed standards for considering fairness to absent
claimants and adequacy of representation.
This symposium illuminates the important legal and public issues
settlement class actions raise. The papers also suggest some answers
that judges and rulemakers would be well-advised to consider.
SOME PERSONAL VIEWS
As organizer, moderator, and introducer, I have viewed my role
as one of asking questions, framing issues, and promoting the vigor-
ous exchange found in this issue of the Cornell Law Review. In closing,
I would like to add my personal views on some of the major policy
issues.
The term "settlement class action" refers to a class action that is
designed to be settled rather than litigated, with the defendant not
objecting to certification of the class providing the settlement is ap-
proved. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 does not provide for set-
tlement class actions as such. The Rule provides for class actions
which meet its many requirements and further provides that "[a] class
46 See ScnucK, supra note 34, at 259-60, 295-96 (discussing the powerful role ofJudge
Weinstein in the Agent Orange case); RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LA~W: THE STORY OF
ThE DALKON SHIELD BANKRuPTcY 336-42 (1991) (discussing the powerful role ofJudge Mer-
hige in the Dalkon Shield case).
47 FED. R. Cv. P. 23(e).
48 See Schwarzer, supra note 11, at 840-43.
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action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of
the court."49 It is an open question whether a settlement rather than
litigation purpose has the effect of relieving the court of making the
findings Rule 23 requires.50
Class actions in mass tort cases are different than two other major
types of class actions that have influenced the development of class
action law and led to judicial attitudes and practices that are inappli-
cable to mass tort cases: (1) aggregated small claims and (2) public
interest suits seeking injunctive relief The consumer class action, in
which a large group of people have claims of small value against a
common defendant, is the classic example of the aggregative function
of class action procedure. An individual consumer with a small claim
will not bring an enforcement action because the claim has little
value, and no lawyer will undertake the representation. The class ac-
tion device, however, allows the pooling of small claims, and if sub-
stantive law provides for an attorney's award to a prevailing plaintiff,
lawyers will be available to vindicate the rights of the class of consum-
ers. In theory, optimal enforcement of law results.
Due process notice and participation issues are very different for
cases involving claimants with small claims than for those involving
claimants with claims worth independent action and separate repre-
sentation. When a million consumers have a ten dollar claim against a
common defendant for an illegal business practice, no single claimant
has a legal right that is worth individual pursuit. Thus, opting out of
the class is neither feasible nor practical. In contrast, opting out of
the class is more likely for claimants in mass tort cases who often have
valuable claims worthy of independent action. Furthermore, an indi-
vidual claim worth so little need not receive the same due process
protection as a substantive tort claim worth many thousands of dollars.
Finally, claimants with small-value claims are dependent upon class
counsel-who has recognized the problem, identified some represen-
tative plaintiffs, and pursued the aggregative remedy-to a degree
that claimants of mass torts do not share.
Public interest litigation seeking injunctive relief, often on fed-
eral constitutional grounds, provides yet another paradigm.5' Where
injunctions are appropriate as an extraordinary remedy ordering the
future, they inevitably affect the rights of current and future class
49 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
50 See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos.
94-1064, 94-1194, 94-1195, 94-1198, 94-1202, 94-1203, 94-1207, 94-1208, 94-1219, 1995 WL
223209 (3d Cir. Apr. 17, 1995) (settlement classes are permissible under Rule 23 but must
meet the same requirements of certification required of litigation classes).
51 Public interest class actions seeking injunctive relief are discussed in John Leub-
sdorf, Co-opting the Cl=s Action, 80 CoP.NEtL L. REv. 1222 (1995), and Koniak, supra note 2,
at 1089-90 n.205.
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members, who will be subject to the same terms governing the af-
fected school, prison, mental institution, or government agency. Rule
23 and surrounding law treat injunction cases separately from other
class actions. The class action is a mandatory one, opt-outs are prohib-
ited, published notice satisfies due process, and the arrangements re-
sulting from the decree are subject to the court's continuing
jurisdiction, periodic modification, and eventual elimination.
Mass tort cases have very different characteristics than public in-
terest suits seeking injunctive relief. Aggregation in mass tort cases is
done for efficiency, not out of necessity; opt-out is required rather
than prohibited; and there is usually no mechanism for modification
of the amounts awarded or of the procedures to be followed in distrib-
uting the fund the defendants have agreed to establish. The tort
claimant's right to damages is forever compromised by the class action
settlement.
Recent experience with class action settlements in mass tort cases
provides notice of danger signals that trial and appellate courts should
be alert to in reviewing the adequacy and reasonableness. Cases like
Georgine,52 General Motors,5 3 and Ford Bronco54 teach us that some fact
patterns carry a red warning flag that class counsel may not have given
the entire class its single-minded, dedicated attention: (1) The fact
that the class action is being certified for settlement purposes only
and that defendants essentially selected class counsel by choosing to
negotiate with them; (2) a class definition that arbitrarily excludes a
large group of similarly-situated persons-those who filed claims
against the defendants prior to an arbitrary date at or near the time
the class action was filed; (3) the existence of side settlements between
class counsel and the defendants of large inventories of cases during
the period in which class counsel has been negotiating different (and
usually less favorable) terms for members of the class; and (4) provi-
sions that permit class counsel to perform conflicting roles in the dis-
pute resolution process handling future claims (filing claims for
individual claimants while simultaneously monitoring the overall pro-
52 The district court's approval of the Georgine settlement is awaiting appellate review
as of April 1995. A pending appeal in the Third Circuit raises jurisdictional and due pro-
cess issues. Appellate review of the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement awaits a
final order of the district court. For discussion of Georgine, see Koniak, supra note 2.
53 In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 94-
1064, 94-1194, 94-1195, 94-1198, 94-1202, 94-1203, 94-1207, 94-1208, 94-1219, 1995 WL
223209 (3d Cir. Apr. 17, 1995) (remanding for reconsideration, under principles stated in
the opinion, a settlement of property damage claims of a class of GM pickup owners).
54 In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., No. Civ. A. MDL-991, 1995 WL
222177 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 1995) (rejecting proposed settlement as unfair, inadequate, and
unreasonable where little discovery was performed prior to settlement, proposed settle-
ment did not give fair value to the compromised claims, and class counsel's premature
settlement did not involve adequate representation of the plaintiff class).
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cess on behalf of the entire class) .55 Happily, the recent Third Circuit
decision striking down the proposed property damage settlement in-
volving General Motors pickup trucks suggests that appellate courts
are learning these lessons.56 Skeptical and thorough inquiry of the
issues described below, among others, is required at both the trial and
appellate level.
1. Representation Issues
Class counsel must be a vigorous advocate of the interests of all
members of the class. It is unlikely that competent, diligent, and loyal
representation of the entire class will result when defendants essen-
tially select one or several plaintiffs' lawyers to represent the class by
expressing a willingness to negotiate with these lawyers. Adequate
representation ordinarily requires representation by lawyers the court
designates after extended consideration of the composition of the
class and the differing interests of various groups within it. As Profes-
sor Coffee states, defendants' ability to select plaintiffs' lawyers in this
manner often sets up a "reverse auction" in which defendants seek to
identify the plaintiffs' lawyer who will submit the lowest plausible set-
tlement offer on behalf of the plaintiff class. 57 The incentives involved
may overwhelm the judgment of otherwise highly ethical lawyers.
An adversary system rests upon the premise that lawyers for a
party are selected by that party, not by the opposing party. When a
55 Several recent class action settlements allow class counsel to monitor and supervise
the administration of the claims-handling process the settlement creates and, at the same
time, represent individual claimants in presenting cases to the claims administrator. In
Georgine, for example, class counsel participates in picking the medical experts, arbitrators,
and others who will pass on claims, including those handled by class counsel. Arrange-
ments of this kind provide class counsel with information not available to other claimants'
lawyers that may benefit those whom class counsel represents. Class counsel's authority as
representatives of the class may also consciously or unconsciously influence the deciders in
passing on claims. The district court in Georgine 157 F.R.D. 246, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1994),
thought appointing additional lawyers as class counsel would solve the problem. A similar
arrangement in Ahearn was the only aspect of the settlement that the district court did not
approve. Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 6:93-CV-526 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 1995) (unre-
ported memorandum opinion). I believe a flat rule should bar such an obvious conflict of
interest.
56 Judge Becker's thorough and thoughtful opinion in the General Motors case pro-
vides safeguards that, if followed by trial judges, will limit the abuse of the class action
process in mass tort cases. See Koniak, sitpra note 2, at 1152-58. The limited review of class
action settlements many trial court judges provide suggests that they view settlements pri-
marily in terms of the convenience to the judiciary in getting rid of cases rather than in
terms of the interests of those for whom thejudicial process is being invoked-class mem-
bers. Appellate courts, which are in a position to take a more disinterested view, need to
redress the balance.
57 John C. Coffee, Jr., Summary, The Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology
of Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. Rxv. 851, 853 (1995), andJohn C. Coffee,Jr., WALL ST.J., Sept.
7, 1994, at A15 ("In short, settlement class actions permit defendants to run a reverse
auction, seeking the lowest bidder from a large population of plaintiffs' attorneys.").
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client is unable to pick a lawyer because of incompetency or indi-
gence, the court selects a lawyer for that party. When a large class of
future tort claimants constitutes the plaintiff class, defendants should
not determine the representation of the class. Rather, a judicial pro-
cess that gives careful consideration to the diverse interests within the
plaintiff class should make such a determination. Thisjudicial inquiry
is essential to ensure adequate representation of all members of the
class. It also will aid a court in determining whether the class is too
large, unwieldy, or diverse to be certified either for settlement or liti-
gation purposes.
Class action settlements generally involve large tradeoffs in which
certain valid legal claims are subordinated to other claims. In the
Georgine case, for example, a substantial portion of the class (claimants
who have pleural markings from asbestos exposure but only limited
breathing disability and no malignancy) receive no cash recovery in
the likely event that disability or malignancy does not occur.58 Simi-
larly, some causes of action recognized by state law are eliminated en-
tirely: claims for punitive damages, loss of consortium, fear of getting
cancer, etc. Although the compensation process the settlement cre-
ates is expected to last several decades, the average awards to claim-
ants with particular injuries are not adjusted for inflation over that
period.
These and other circumstances indicate that some groups within
the class are being treated less favorably than others. Those class
members who have the most serious injuries now or in the very near
future receive the bulk of the settlement proceeds; others who have
valid and valuable legal claims under governing state tort law receive
nothing; and those who will be injured later will receive amounts sub-
stantially reduced by inflation.
The question here is not whether these tradeoffs are a reasonable
resolution on the part of an Olympian policy maker engaged in allo-
cating the limited assets of an insolvent company. The settlement
class action is not a bankruptcy proceeding. Most settlement class ac-
tions involve solvent companies that are attempting to stabilize and
limit their future tort exposure. Even ifjudicial authority and federal-
ism permit the choices the settling parties made to bind future claim-
ants, an essential precondition is that future claimants consented to
the elimination of their state tort rights by a settlement resulting from
a process in which they were adequately represented by class counsel.
It is a due process issue, not merely a fairness concern, whether class
58 The pleural claims of current claimants, however, received substantial cash com-
pensation in the inventory settlements that accompanied the negotiation of the Georgine
class action. See Koniak, supra note 2, at 1064-65.
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counsel adequately represented the class as a whole, and major sub-
groups within it, in the settlement negotiations.
Adequate representation of a huge class of future tort claimants is
possible, if at all, only if the lawyers negotiating for the class are repre-
sentative of all the major divisions and groups within the class. That
can be accomplished in either or both of two ways: First, the trial
judge can undertake to designate the lawyers for the class, giving care-
ful consideration to the differing interests of various class members.
Second, the trial judge can appoint lawyers for identifiable subclasses
to supplement the class counsel who filed the action.
Interests that are not represented in a negotiation are unlikely to
receive fair treatment. In the breast implants litigation, Judge Pointer
appointed a settlement committee that was broadly representative of
the class. The resulting negotiation was a reasonably open, par-
ticipatory, and reliable process. It is noteworthy, however, that for-
eign claimants made up the only subgroup that fared badly in the
proposed settlement. This subgroup was not represented on the set-
tlement committee. The lesson is that a court-approved settlement
committee that is broadly representative of the class should negotiate
class action settlements affecting the rights of future tort claimants, or,
alternatively, adequate representation should be provided to sub-
classes by separate designation and representation.
2. Scope of the Class: Exclusion of Current Claimants from the Class
Future claimants have special characteristics that make them es-
pecially vulnerable: They are absent, invisible, and passive. Because
future claimants do not have a substantial current interest in the set-
tlement negotiation, they are very unlikely to take an active role in it
even if they are aware they may acquire a future interest. Unlike cur-
rent clients with matured and asserted substantial claims, they are not
visiting a lawyer's office to tell the lawyer of the hardships caused by
delays in payment ofjust claims. Nor are they calling to inquire about
the status of their cases. Current clients, who do engage in such activi-
ties, have presence, voice, and visibility; and the settlement amounts
they receive provide immediate relief to them and a substantial con-
tingent fee for their lawyers.
Future claimants, on the other hand, are an imagined group, an
abstraction, at the time a "futures" settlement is negotiated. We know
that a substantial number of people will in the future assert claims
against the defendants, but their identity is unknown to the settling
parties, the court, and often to themselves. Future claimants are more
likely to be exploited because they are never present at the negotiat-
ing table, and their interests are hypothetical, indefinite, and
uncertain.
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A class that is defined to include only future claimants has an odd
shape, which itself is a suspicious circumstance. In a number of re-
cent settlement class actions, such as the Georgine and Ahearn cases in
the asbestos field59 and the Beeman case involving owners of homes
with polybutylene plumbing systems,60 the class is limited to future
claimants, excluding all those who have filed a claim prior to or near
the date on which the class action was filed. The effect of this exclu-
sion is to carve out of the class all the clients of plaintiffs' lawyers in
the particular field for whom lawsuits had been filed on the specified
date. This is a suspicious circumstance because the class definition
does not conform to the reasons for creating it. The exclusion of cur-
rent claimants is neither inevitable nor necessary. A number of recent
mass tort class action settlements-including those involving the
Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, 6' the breast implants case, 62 and
the Bjork-Shiley heart valve settlement6 3-do not carve current claim-
ants out of the class by means of side settlements on different terms.
The purpose and justification of nonmandatory opt-out class ac-
tions are to resolve claims that present common questions of law and
fact in a manner that is superior, more efficient, and fairer than indi-
vidual lawsuits can provide. Yet, the claims of individuals who have
already filed suit raise issues of law and fact identical to those who
have not done so.6 The settling parties should provide a strong justi-
fication for any arbitrary exclusion of a large number of people from a
class. The reason the parties offer should be consistent with the pur-
poses of creating the class: Resolution of numerous claims involving
common questions of law and fact that can be handled better and
more fairly in a single action.
Class counsel invariably claim that the proposed settlement is in
the best interests of future claimants. They also argue that the current
tort system, with its delays, costs, and erratic treatment of individual
claimants, is vastly inferior to the expedition, uniformity, and certainty
of the methods of administrative resolution that the class action settle-
59 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Ahearn v.
Fibreboard Corp., No. 93-526 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 1993 and Mar. 20, 1995).
60 Beeman v. Shell Oil, Co., No. 93-47363 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Harris County Feb. 16,
1995).
61 In re A.H. Robins, Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) grew out of the bankruptcy
proceeding involving the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield. It was a (b) (1) class action
involving an insurance fund of Robins's product liability insurer;, a limited back-end opt-
out was provided to some future claimants. For discussion of A.H. Robins, see Koniak, supra
note 2, at 1104-06.
62 See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Coming
Corp.), Nos. CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P-11558-S, MDL No. 926, 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 1, 1994).
63 Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed, No. 92-3973
(6th Cir.1993).
64 See Koniak, supra note 2, at 1057-58.
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ment provides. Since the claims of current claimants raise precisely
the same questions of fact and law that future claimants will present,
the "superior" benefits of the class settlement's policies and proce-
dures should be offered to current claimants. Current claimants, of
course, are the group that is most likely to receive notice of the class
action. Published notices will get their attention, and their lawyers
will likely give them specific notice. Equally important, the lawyers of
current claimants are in a good position to advise them in light of
individual circumstances whether remaining in the class or opting out
would best serve their interests. If the class action settlement has the
benefits claimed for it-a fairer, cheaper, earlier, and more uniform
resolution of claims-current as well as future claimants should have
the opportunity to gain these benefits.
The failure to include those who have already filed suit suggests
that reasons other than judicial economy and the efficient handling of
common questions of law and fact motivated the shape of the class.
The explanation is found in a circumstance that accompanies settle-
ment classes composed only of future claimants: Side settlements of
the current inventories of class counsel and of other plaintiffs' lawyers
on terms different and more favorable than those to be provided to
members of the class.
Why would defendants be willing to take this approach? Defend-
ants' potential liability to a large and uncertain number of future
claimants poses a much greater threat to defendants' interests than
the provision of favorable settlements in the smaller group of cur-
rently pending cases. Nor can defendants make side settlements with
class counsel and not offer the same terms to the clients of other
plaintiffs' lawyers: The differential treatment given to class counsel's
current claimants combined with their negotiation of the rights of fu-
ture claimants would be too much to swallow. These circumstances
suggest the reasons for excluding current claimants from the class: It
is a way of rewarding class counsel and other cooperative plaintiffs'
lawyers for their help in supporting a settlement that does not reflect
the full value of the tort claims of the class of future claimants.
Current claimants are carved out of the class for reasons of de-
fendants' strategy that inevitably create troubling conflicts of interest
on the part of class counsel and other plaintiffs' lawyers. The strategic
explanation is that defendants were willing to offer favorable terms to
current claimants because they hoped to deter plaintiffs' lawyers from
opposing the class action settlement. The large cash pay outs to cur-
rent clients of plaintiffs' lawyers divides the plaintiffs' bar and makes a
global settlement easier to reach. The dark side of this strategy is that
class counsel-usually plaintiffs' lawyers who have the largest inven-
tories of pending cases-are receiving favorable terms for current cli-
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ents in exchange for a cooperative attitude in negotiating
arrangements for future claimants who are mostly the prospective cli-
ents of other lawyers. The result is that class counsel settles current
claims against the same defendants on different and more favorable
terms than the settlements provide to future claimants who constitute
the class-a troubling conflict of interest.
A sound general principle is that individuals who have similar
claims against the same defendants should be treated similarly. The
fact that some claimants have hired a lawyer and filed a claim, while
others have not, does not justify disposing of their claims on a differ-
ent basis. 65 The exclusion of current claimants from a settlement class
action, carving them out for separate treatment, is inconsistent with
the principles that govern the definition of the class (superior and
more efficient resolution of cases involving common questions of fact
and law) and is a reliable indicator that the interests of the settling
parties, rather than those of tort victims, have influenced or deter-
mined the definition of the class and the terms of the settlement
One means of assuring that current and future claimants receive
even-handed treatment, as the Second Circuit stated in the Ivy case,66
is the application of the same substantive and procedural dispute reso-
lution provisions to both groups. The breast implants settlement
takes this course. However, the Georgine settlement excludes the cur-
rent clients of class counsel and of other plaintiffs' lawyers who were
willing to accept the defendants' restrictions on future representa-
tion.67 It is noteworthy that the 1994 amendment to the Bankruptcy
Act, authorizing a bankruptcy court to consider and preclude future
tort claims against the bankrupt entity, contains two restrictions: Fu-
ture claimants must be treated in a manner similar to that of current
claimants, and there must be assurance that funds will remain to pay
their claims.68 The same policies should be followed when a solvent
defendant seeks to terminate and cap future liability to those who
65 This point is discussed in Koniak, supra note 2, at 1075-78.
66 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1437 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994).
67 The restrictions on the future representation of asbestos victims by plaintiffs' law-
yers in Georgine's side settlements present a troublesome ethical problem. See Koniak, supra
note 2, 1128-37.
68 11 U.S.C. § 524(g), (h) (1994), as amended by § 111 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1994. Section (g) establishes a procedure in a chapter 11 reorganization proceeding for
dealing with future personal injury claims against the debtor based on exposure to asbes-
tos-containing products. The procedure involves the establishment of a trust to pay the
future claims, coupled with an injunction to prevent future claimants from suing the
debtor. In order for the trust arrangements to bind future claimants, § 111 requires that
the trust operate in a structure and manner necessary to give reasonable assurance that the
trust will value, and be able to pay, similar present and future claims in substantially the
same manner.
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have been injured by or exposed to the defendant's product or
activities.
3. "Side Settlements" with Current Claimants Who Are Excluded from
the Class
Simultaneously negotiated side settlements are highly suspect be-
cause they may constitute an impermissible representation of conflict-
ing interests resulting in inadequate representation of the class. The
side settlements suggest that class counsel has been laboring under an
impermissible conflict of interest and that it may have preferred the
interests of current clients to those of the future claimants in the set-
tlement class. The question is whether there is a relationship or tie
between the terms of the side settlements and those in the class action
settlement. Was the settlement posture of defendants one of offering
to provide generous cash settlements to class counsel's current clients
in return for different, and possibly less favorable, settlement terms
with respect to the class of future claimants? In responding to defend-
ants' settlement posture, did class counsel subordinate the interests of
the class to those of current clients and themselves? If so, the class was
provided inadequate representation during the vital negotiation
period.
The burden is on the settling parties to establish that class coun-
sel provided fully adequate representation to the class during the ne-
gotiation of the settlement. Because court approval substitutes for
client consent under concurrent conflicts rules, and absent class mem-
bers are deemed to have consented if class counsel provided adequate
representation, inadequate representation 'is a due process violation
and not merely a matter of legal ethics. No showing of corrupt intent
is necessary. 69 Class counsel must demonstrate that a desire to obtain
cash settlements for current clients on favorable terms or an interest
in the substantial contingent fees from the side settlements did not
materially affect their representation of future claimants.
Courts can and should make detailed inquiries about side settle-
ments in settlement class actions involving future claimants. Cases in
which defendants make direct payments to lawyers representing the
class in exchange for class settlements are nonexistent or rare; the
incentives defendants proffer to plaintiffs' lawyers always take the indi-
rect form of attorneys' fee awards in the class action, side settlements
of other cases, or both. If the court ignores indirect incentives, it will
be ignoring what courts and scholars have repeatedly said are a great
danger in class actions generally and especially in settlement class ac-
69 Collusion is shown by a review of the outcome of the negotiation. See In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 659 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.
1981) (collusion established by scrutiny of the settlement terms).
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tions, which are maintained or certified solely for purposes of
settlement.
Inquiry must be made concerning the settlement posture of de-
fendants who were faced with a number of filed claims and a poten-
tially larger and more expensive group of future claims. If those
defendants implicitly or explicitly tied their willingness to settle class
counsel's current cases to counsel's agreement to a class settlement
providing different and less favorable terms for future claimants, class
counsel were engaged in a simultaneous representation of conflicting
interests. If so, the class received inadequate representation.
A lawyer's fundamental duty of loyalty stems from agency law and
has been part of the common law governing lawyers for centuries.
This law provides that a lawyer may not undertake the representation
of one client that poses a substantial threat of interfering with a com-
mitted, diligent representation of another current client. State and
federal courts have applied this general principle in many disqualifica-
tion decisions, and in 1983, the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct restated it in Rule 1.7(b) :70 A lawyer,
in the absence of both reasonableness and client consent, is prohibited
from representing two clients (or groups of clients) who have separate
claims against the same defendant when the defendant is offering
terms to one client that adversely affect the other client. The facts in a
number of recent settlement class actions make it clear that the two
sets of deals are interconnected. If the terms of the two deals are dif-
ferent, the court should presume that representation of the class was
inadequate.
The question under the first branch of Model Rule 1.7(b) is
whether the defendants' settlement posture (i.e., their willingness to
settle the claims of current clients on favorable terms providing the
same lawyers agree to terms for the class of future claimants that are
different or less favorable) might "adversely affect" or "materially
limit" the lawyers' representation of either client. The test is an objec-
tive one and does not turn on the subjective good faith of the lawyers.
An impermissible conflict in concurrent representation may arise out
70 A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the common representation
and the advantages and risks involved.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1992).
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of the settlement position or strategy of a common defendant.7' It is
unreasonable for the lawyer to proceed, even if the consent require-
ment of the rule has been met, if the situation is one in which his
representation of either client will be materially limited.
The second requirement of concurrent representation of differ-
ing interests-client consent after full disclosure-cannot be literally
applied to class action cases. Lawyers for the class should ordinarily
consult the representative plaintiffs, but ultimately the consent re-
quirement must be met by court scrutiny of the situation. The court
acts as guardian for members of the class. The first requirement, how-
ever, must be met in all cases, wholly apart from client consent.
Model Rule 1.7(b) is a "consent-plus" rule: The reasonableness re-
quirement must be met even if the client consents or is incapable of
consent (arguably the situation involved in class actions limited to fu-
ture claimants).
The concurrent representation problem is acute in class actions
in which large inventories of current cases are settled while putative
class counsel is negotiating at the same time and with the same de-
fendants a settlement binding only on future claimants. Will future
claimants receive the same terms as current claimants? If not, why
not? Was counsel's judgment in representing one group of clients
(the class of future claimants) materially limited because of the law-
yer's desire to serve the interests of current clients? Were the lawyer's
own interests involved because the inventory settlements involved
large contingent fees? Even if the class representatives have been in-
formed about the concurrent representation of current clients and of
the side settlements made with current claimants, and had consented
to the joint representation after being fully informed, it would be un-
reasonable for class counsel to proceed if defendants' settlement pos-
ture tied payment of current claims to settlement terms for the future
claimants that were less favorable. In Fiandaca v. Cunningham,72 for
example, the court held that it was "inconceivable" that a lawyer could
represent a class of female prisoners whose interests were potentially
adverse to those of another class, a conflict created by the terms of the
defendant's settlement offer.
Lawyers assuming the representation of future claimants owe fi-
duciary duties to those persons that correspond to the duties a re-
tained lawyer owes to a current client. A technical lawyer-client
relationship does not exist until and unless the court appoints class
71 The Comment to Model Rule 1.7 states explicitly that "[a]n impermissible conflict
may exist by reason of... incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact
that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 Comment (1992) (emphasis added).
72 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987).
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counsel as such. However, the cases all state that lawyers who appoint
themselves to negotiate or litigate for a class are required to be loyal,
competent, and diligent in advancing the interests of all class mem-
bers because they held themselves out as acting on their behalf.73 The
putative clients cannot be bound by what lawyers they have not re-
tained have done in purporting to represent them. However, the law-
yers are bound by actions taken on behalf of the future claimants. If
class counsel fails to give them undivided loyalty, reasonable care, and
diligent representation during the negotiation period, they are (or
should be) liable to the future claimants in malpractice for harm
caused, disqualified in a court proceeding, and subject to professional
discipline. The absence of a formal lawyer-client relationship until
and unless a formal appointment takes place is irrelevant.
4. Due Process Notice Issues Relating to Future Claimants
A settlement cannot bind a tort claimant unless that person has
consented to it. A class action purports to bind members of a class of
tort victims on the theory that the required opt-out during the notice
period provides them with a real opportunity to choose whether or
not to participate in the class. "Unknown" but currently injured class
members-those who know they are class members but whose names
and addresses are not known to the settling parties-may be consid-
ered to have an effective up-front opt-out opportunity. Moreover, the
monitoring efforts of current claimants who do receive notice and
participate in the proceeding will benefit similarly situated current
claimants who do not participate. But "unknowing" members of the
class-those who do not know that they have been exposed to defend-
ants' products or that they have or will suffer an injury in the future-
cannot be given notice. They will not recognize that any notice ap-
plies to them, whatever the manner by which it is broadcast. Unknow-
ing future claimants have neither an effective opportunity to opt out
during the notice period nor anyone who can embody their interests
in the settlement negotiation or its review by the court.
Those who do not have a present awareness of injury or who have
no current legal claim have a due process objection to a class action
that eliminates their tort rights under governing state law. It is diffi-
cult or impossible to give this category of future claimants the re-
quired notice of the class action and opportunity to opt out that the
73 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 955 (1978) (analyzing the many situations in which a lawyer
owes duties of loyalty and confidentiality to persons with whom no formal lawyer-client
relationship has been established); Togstad v. Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980) (duty
of care owed to person who had consulted lawyer to determine whether she and her hus-
band had a legal claim against a third person, even though lawyer declined to undertake
the matter).
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due process clauses of state and federal constitutions require.7 4 Fu-
ture claimants of this sort will not be attentive to published notices.
Even if they see or read them, the lack of a specific injury denies them
the opportunity to make an informed opt-out choice. Reasonable no-
tice to absent members of the class is also part of the adequacy of
representation that class counsel owe their clients. A class action set-
tlement that treats a substantial portion of the class so unfairly should
be rejected under Rule 23(e) as unreasonable and unfair.
Trial courts have approved a number of recent mass tort class
actions including both current and future claimants because they pro-
vided meaningful back-end opt-outs to future claimants. That is, an
individual, after pursuing the claims-handling process created by the
settlement, may choose to reject its result, opt out of the class, and
pursue judicial remedies. The future claimant makes this decision
possessing substantial information about the extent of the loss and
about the relief, if any, provided by the dispute-resolution machinery
the settlement created. The cases involving the Dalkon Shield in-
trauterine device, the recent heart valve case (Bowling v. fizer) and
the recent breast implants case (Lindsey v. Dow Coming), have in-
cluded the back-end opt-out approach and have been much praised
for this feature. Providing class members with a back-end opt-out goes
a long way toward meeting the due process requirements of notice
and consent and is fairer to .future claimants.
CONCLUSION
Innovation and creativity have marked the rapid development of
the settlement class action as a means of handling mass torts. But the
process of development has suffered from lawlessness-ad hoc ar-
rangements that rest on little or no precedent, were not anticipated by
the drafters of Rule 23, and stretch judicial authority and concepts of
federalism beyond their traditional limits. This has been justified in
the name of necessity-case disposition as an end that justifies ex-
traordinary means. The recent General Motors decision suggests that a
regime of law with stated principles and procedures to guide trial
court discretion may gradually replace the chaos and lawlessness that
now characterize the settlement of mass tort class actions. The devel-
opment of such principles by judicial decision, court rule, or statute is
much needed.
74 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (in class actions
brought for money damages, and not involving administration of a res, the distribution of
an estate or trust, or the handling of a bankruptcy, due process requires that absent class
members receive reasonable notice, the opportunity to opt out and adequate representa-
tion, at least when the class action form is used as a matter of efficiency). See Koniak, supra
note 2, at 1087; Miller & Crump, supra note 28, at 16-38.
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